

The Evolution of *Shari'ah*-Consciousness in Kashmir: An Interpretation of Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani's Historical Role

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The essence of law (*Shari'ah*) in the Qur'an is not merely immutability of the divine injunctions but their eternal and universal relevance for the humankind. The obedience to Allah and His Messenger (ﷺ) in all forms of a believer's individual and social behavior is the *sine qua non* of the Islamic law.¹

Until the codification of the *Shari'ah* by four revered religious leaders (imams) of the *ahl-i Sunnah wa jam'a*, adherence to the norms of the Qur'an and moral conduct of the Prophet Muhammad (*Sunnah*) was the rule rather than an exception, notwithstanding hair-splitting controversies over a number of religious and social issues. Credit goes to four imams who saved the community (*ummah*) from dismemberment of chaotic and schismatic type. What is, however, of importance to note, though least emphasized, is that reinterpretation of the *Shari'ah* by each imam was not a law unto itself but an ideal system of social morality, a uniting and reconciling influence on practice and 'court of appeal' in times of necessity.

The spirit of *Shari'ah*, in terms of history, manifested itself in two principal ways: in the state which even though un-Islamic in character after the institution of monarchy (*mulūkiyah*), could not function without *shaykh al-Islam*, *sadr*, *qāzi*, *mufti* and so on. The *Shari'ah* guided the life of the family and that of community in tension and conflicts that were by and large resolved into harmony and balance.

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The polity in Islamic history, excluding, of course, the Pious Caliphate (*Khilāfat-i Rāshidah*) was never the total expression of the Qur'anic *Shari'ah* and the *Sunnah*. But it must be argued that the individual lives, or for that matter, even in considerable cases, family life,² and not the least, *the khānqah* life of the Sufis of main orders,³ were by and large, moulded and governed by the Qur'anic *Shari'ah* and the *Sunnah*. From the standpoint of history, the inner strength of Islam was embedded in the role of creative personalities who generally kept aloof from politics and declined even highest positions offered to them in the government. Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal and Imam Ahmad Ghazali — to mention only a few names — illustrate the point. Such individuals were men of exceptional spiritual and intellectual calibre.

True, monarchy was incompatible with Islam⁴; but Muslim thinkers, scholars, Sufis and theologians sought to promote the forces of social stability within the broader framework of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. Viewed against this background, the letters (*maktūbāt*) of Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani⁵ addressed to various sultans and individuals form an important watershed in the annals of Islamic history. The importance of these letters⁶ needs to be understood in the context of fluid political-scenario of the Central Asian region of the fourteenth century. The *ḥadīth*: "The ink of a scholar is holier than that of a martyr"⁷ typifies the role of Sayyid Ali. The objective assessment of his contribution towards promoting a better understanding of Islam in terms of disseminating the teachings of the Qur'an, *ḥadīth* and *tasawwuf* through a plethora of works including particularly *Dhakhirat al-Muluk*,⁸ *Maktūbāt*, *Aurad-i Fathiyyah*⁹ and mystic poetry has remained desideratum. Sayyid Ali's achievements in this respect together with his extensive travels in the Muslim world show how systematic, organized, sustained and harmonious was his thought and behaviour in rekindling the spirit of *jihād-i akbar* or *jihād bil nafs*¹⁰. It needs to be emphasized that Sayyid Ali's teachings contain powerful elements of affirmation, protest and creativity that cannot be adequately accounted for simply by the historical circumstances in which they manifested. He propounds the virtues of self-knowledge for the creation of vigilant, virtuous, enlightened and

just society. Keeping his focus on the spiritual and ethical underpinnings of the Islamic way of life, we have not attempted to present Sayyid Ali's thought in terms of an ideology. Undoubtedly, from the standpoint of Western history, the problematic of ideology has emerged "in close connection with both political practice and the development of science." Not the least, ideology first emerged in the West as a critique of religion compartmentalising human life into religious and secular.¹¹

Before we reflect on some letters of Sayyid Ali in conjunction with his major work *Dhakhīrat al-Mulūk*, it seems necessary to stress that *Sharī'ah* has generally been understood by the great Sufis of Islam as the moral law, given by the Qur'an to determine the duties of man in relation to Allah and his fellow beings, both in congruence with its *Tawhidic Weltanschauung* and the *Sunnah*. The *Sharī'ah* comprises the juridical and political obligations as codified in the four schools of Sunni theology. This also explains the fact that most Sufis urged the rulers to render justice in accordance with its true spirit without being members of the ruling elite. However, viewed from the long-term historical perspective,¹² the *Sharī'ah* may be described as a vitalising challenge and a vivifying force both with regard to its creative originality and ability to communicate in dialogue with other cultures. Seen in this perspective, the role of *Sharī'ah* in moulding societies in particular socio-historical contexts calls for objective analysis. While in such an analysis the sociological significance of syncretism, synthesis and appropriation cannot be brushed aside, nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that societies exposed to the radiant influence of the *Sharī'ah* have always been characterized by creative and dynamic tension. This is not suggest that the process of Islamization as such is an outgrowth of the triumphant pure *Sharī'ah*; but it is in reality, a ramification of a process in which individuals or groups adapt themselves to the *Sharī'ah*-oriented culture by assimilating its values through orderly evolution. The predicament or the tension that has always characterized individuals or groups in Muslim societies is whether to adjust themselves to the cultural boundaries of their geographical environment or mould the ethnocentric environment in consonance with the spirit of their *Tawhidic Weltanschauung*.¹³ In this paper, an attempt has

been made to show how Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani sought to guide both rulers and his disciples at a time of crisis in Islamic history through dialogue and above all through precept and personal example. He did not propound any political theory; nor did he propagate rebellion against the sultans whose governments were by all accounts un-Islamic in character.

Guided by the spirit of the Qur'an and the wisdom (*hikmah*) of the Prophet (ﷺ), the best possible course for a Sufi scholar and missionary like Sayyid Ali Hamadani was not to associate himself with the activities of secular states but to make their rulers conform their behaviour to the *Shari'ah* and the *Sunnah* in their personal lives. Not only did he aim at persuading the rulers to enforce the *Shari'ah* within the possible limits of their social environments, but also more importantly, his main concern was to ensure the viability of the *Shari'ah* by making it intelligible to commoners through reforming the behaviour of the sultans and the ruling elite. In this respect Sultan Qutbuddin's (1373-89) reconversion to Islam¹⁴ provides the best example of the seminal role played by Sayyid Ali in generating *Shari'ah* consciousness first among the elite rather than Kashmiri masses who were separated from him by barriers of linguistic communication. For that matter, in the context of his role in Central Asia and Kashmir, Sayyid Ali's works were addressed to the elite comprising scholars, Sufis, missionaries, sultans and nobles. His aim was neither to establish a universal Islamic state nor was it to overthrow the un-Islamic governments. What is of significance to emphasize is that he regarded stable governments, no matter monarchies as essential for enforcing the *Shari'ah* in a given historical situation.¹⁵

Conscious of the seminal rather than the revolutionary nature of his mission, the Sayyid is reported to have said that it was beyond the ken of his contemporaries to understand his role and that it would be understood only a century after his death.¹⁶ Sayyid Ali was, in fact, deeply conscious of the political crisis that prevailed in Central Asia in the fourteenth century. The independent Muslim kingdoms with their power-groups had regional or ethnic basis. As Aziz Ahmad rightly observes that they "coalesced or divided into factions, either in support of their sovereigns

or in revolt, a pattern of elite power-distribution which was knit altogether different from that of South Asia." ¹⁷ The structure of various kingdoms in Central Asia was, indeed, fragile.

But the case of Kashmir was slightly different in that an independent Muslim kingdom had been founded in 1320 in the Hindu-Buddhist surroundings. Significantly, the first convert to Islam in Kashmir was Rinchana, the Buddhist adventurer from Ladakh, who seized power from the Hindu ruler of Kashmir.¹⁸ His conversion at the hands of Sayyid Sharafuddin Suharwardi, though essentially the result of deep yearnings of his soul, may be attributed to the refusal of the Saivite Brahman religious hierarchy of Srinagar to admit him to the Kshatriya caste (*varna*) "which had been the common practice of the absorption of the foreign invaders in north west India for several centuries into the social fabric of Hindu society, and helping them with a local power-base."¹⁹

The very fact that even as a king Rinchana was refused initiation in Hinduism²⁰ shows that Saivite Brahmanism of Kashmir was ethnocentric, though not apolitical in nature. So long as Brahmans did not feel challenge to their particularism, it did not matter whether a ruler was a Hindu or a Muslim. This explains the fact that until the reign of Sultan Sikandar (1389-1413) the Brahman chroniclers are not concerned about the decline of Hinduism in the face of peaceful percolation of Islamic teachings through Sufis and Ulama. Significantly, however, the basic infrastructure for Islam in Kashmir developed in secular and syncretistic surroundings. Thus, for example, while the first mosque and *khānqah* in Kashmir were founded by Rinchana in the nerve centre of the Brahmans of Srinagar, Sutan Shihabuddin (1354-73) spared no efforts in promoting the cause of Islam without proclaiming himself to be the Defender of the Faith. What is of significance to emphasize is that the Brahman 'elite of Srinagar did not object to the grant of *jāgirs* to Sufis and Ulama for the maintenance of *khānqahs*, mosques and *madāris* during the formative stage of Islam in the Valley.^{20(a)}

The early success of Islam in Kashmir may, therefore, be explained in terms of a nexus of close relationship between the sultans and a power-base provided

by the Brahman elite of Srinagar. However, it needs to be pointed out that syncretism was an important element in the Islam of Kashmir before the advent of Sayyid A. Hamadani.²¹ Notwithstanding the influence of Sayyid Sharafuddin on Rinchan and his Buddhist followers, the *Shari'ah* was not strictly adhered to either by the Sultans or a tiny minority of neo-Muslims in Srinagar. Sultan Qutbuddin's daily visits to a temple in Srinagar along with his Muslim subjects,²² performance of Hindu rituals²³, distribution of gifts to the Brahmans for performing a yagana to avert an apprehended catastrophe²⁴ preponderance of Brahman and Buddhist ministers in the Sultan's secretariat—all point to the secular nature of the Sultanate before the advent of Sayyid Ali in Kashmir. However, the point that needs to be emphasized is that Sayyid Ali while urging the Sultan of Kashmir to enforce the *Shari'ah* in his kingdom²⁵ within possible limits nowhere insists that the Brahmans should be debarred from holding high positions in the government. Most scholars and historians have extolled the role of Sayyid Ali to the skies in bringing about the radical transformation of Kashmir by way of securing mass conversions to Islam through his miraculous feats or exploits. Although I have discussed this question at some length elsewhere,²⁶ it will here suffice to say that far from bringing about the radical Islamization of the government and society, Sayyid Ali created an ambience for the orderly evolution of *Shari'ah* consciousness or what may be termed the *Shari'ah*-oriented culture.

The evolution of the *Shari'ah*-oriented culture is a development within the fold of Islam and history. *Shari'ah* is the norm or criteria while the development of the *Shari'ah*-oriented culture is dependent on how people respond to the norms in specific socio-historical contexts. This distinction between the norm and the actual practice is also explicable in terms of the difference between Islam and Islamization. While in the strictest spiritual sense Islam does not mean more than total surrender to the will of Allah, Islamization signifies the unfolding of a continuous process in society in terms of an unending dialogue between religion and society. Such process brings to the fore various implications of the process of conversion to Islam ranging from spiritual to social in individual and collective terms. The strengt

of Islam, therefore, in my opinion, lies in the never-ceasing debate in Muslim societies about what is and what is not Islam. Against such formulation, the continual recitation of an invocatory prayer, *Aurād-i Faḥiyyah*,²⁸ compiled by Sayyid Ali Hamadani, aloud in chorus at congregations, despite the criticism of the Ahl-i Hadith and Jamat-i Islami,²⁹ should be regarded as a source of strength for Islam in Kashmir rather than a violation of Shari'ah or Sunnah.

The continued practice of reciting *awrād*, *n'at*, *manajāt* and *durūd* aloud in the mosques, *khānqahs* and *dargahs* of Kashmir is not an innovation (*bid'a*) or deviation from the Sunnah; but, in terms of history, it was a spiritual and emotional response to Islam by a people at the crossroads. In the context of this formulation, the recitation of *Aurād-i Faḥiyyah* in loud chorus in Kashmir may be regarded as a historical development within the fold of the *Shari'ah*-oriented culture. Since the ritual chanting can have effect on both individual and society in terms of their respective spiritual and historical development,³⁰ this is the reason that the development of *Shari'ah*-consciousness in the Valley was a sublimated rather than a dogmatic process. The development of *Shari'ah*-oriented culture or, in other words, the *Shari'ah*-consciousness among the folk, was integrally bound up with the peoples' response at the societal level to Sayyid Ali's teachings and mission during the chequered periods of historical evolution. This response is also reflected in the miracle-mongering that casts a veil over the historical role of Sayyid Ali.

The most popular story about miraculous and dramatic conversions secured under the influence of Sayyid Ali is the one related to the throwing of their sacred threads by the Brahmans into the river Jhelum. Such conversions are said to have resulted from the conversion of a prominent Brahman ascetic of Srinagar. While I have elsewhere discussed at some length the societal dimension of miracles,^{30(a)} it will here suffice to say that Sayyid Ali's writings do not testify to his encounter with the Brahmans in such supernatural terms. Contrariwise, on the eve of his departure from Kashmir, the Sayyid characterises the Kashmir Valley as the region of infidels³¹. But then the devotion of true Brahman elicits the praise of

Sayyid Ali in a couplet composed by him:³²

If the Brahman peeps into my (inner) condition,
he will turn me out of his sight;
In that he would not allow a wicked man like me
to present myself before the idol.

We therefore need to promote a better understanding of Sayyid Ali's historical and creative role on the basis of a careful examination of his major work viz. *Dhakhirat al-Mulūk* and *Maktūbāt*, rather than on the latter-day perceptions of the chroniclers and hagiographers centred round his miraculous exploits. Likewise we should not allow ourselves to be carried away by the continued attempts in our own day at presenting Sayyid Ali as a precursor of modern politico-religious ideology of Islam. While in a modern ideological version of Islam, human activity is centred to the dialectic of politics and revolution,³³ however, in Sayyid Ali's thought, the emphasis is more and more on imbibing the inner spirit of both the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*.

Sayyid Ali is not only superbly conscious of the excellence of the concept of the Islamic nature of the *Khilāfat-i Rāshidah*, he is equally aware of the role played by subversive forces within the society during the early phase of Islamic history.³⁴ He does not therefore lend support to a theory or ideology of *khilafah* not consistent with the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. His concept of government evolves towards the individuals gifted with spiritual 'elan and invested with the divine authority to rule. Should an individual realise that he is intrinsically the vicegerent of Allah³⁵ on the earth, his role will not be confined within the territorial and political confines of this world. Inspired by the Qur'anic belief that sovereignty belongs to Allah alone, the man of God does not aim at capturing political power or usurping sovereignty of the insolent world. According to Sayyid Ali, Adam's existence was an epitome of two *mansabs*, namely, *nubūwwut* and Sultanate or government.³⁶ The most illustrious examples of such exalted office were only a few revered figures like the prophets, namely, Yusuf, Musa, Dawd, Sulaiman (AS), Muhammad (ﷺ) and *Khulafa-i Rāshidūn*. However, Sayyid Ali is very critical of such rulers as

held the *mansab* of the sultanate for personal aggrandizement. He regards the *mansab* of that kind as a breeding ground for the snares of self (*nafs*).³⁷ Thus any kind of obsession with this world or government or politics is at the root of turning the kings into tyrants and despots.³⁸ Far from preaching rebellion against the un-Islamic sultanates of his time in a radical sense, he addressed himself to the primary role of a *dā'i* in the Qur'anic and Sunnatic context.³⁹ Notwithstanding his criticism, in severest terms,⁴⁰ of such rulers as flagrantly violated the *Shari'ah*, he invariably considers the sultan to be the vicegerent of God.⁴¹ And, far from advocating the concept of an Islamic state in unrealistic or romantic terms, he fosters the ideal of welfare state, based on the spiritual and social ethics of the Qur'anic *Shari'ah* and the Sunnah⁴² in the pluralistic structure of Allah's making.

Little wonder, then, that Sayyid Ali presents the prophets and *khulafa-i rashidūn* as ideal Muslim rulers. Their glory did not lie in military strength but in infinite human concern for the most deprived sections of the society. Several anecdotes related by Sayyid Ali regarding the chosen poverty (*faqr*) of the prophets and pious *khulafa* reinforce his views about the welfare of the poor as the primary aim of the Islamic state. Significantly, in the post-Pious Caliphate, the ruler who merits his attention in *Dhakhīrat al-Mulūk* is 'Umar bin Abdul Aziz.⁴³ True, Umar inherited a huge fortune from his father, but he distributed his riches among the poor and orphans soon after assuming the reins of government in his hands. He ordered that his salary be paid in proportion to the average earnings of a labourer in Baghdad. Sayyid Ali refers to a letter of 'Umar bin Abdul Aziz to Hasan Basri in which the *khalīfah* had sought the Shaikh's guidance for being able to follow the example of the second caliph, 'Umar bin Khatab. The Shaikh's reply is worthy of quote: "You do not belong to the time of 'Umar and your men are not like those of Umar. But if in this age you play the role of Umar among your men and do what Umar did, you will be better than 'Umar."⁴⁴

Conclusion

Sayyid Ali's terms of reference are not to any dogmatic theology but to the

Qur'anic principles of justice (*adl*), beneficence (*ihsān*) and mercy (*rahmah*).⁴⁵ The principles of governance enunciated by him in the light of *Shari'ah* are not a matter of theoretical formulation but historical realisation. That his explanations with reference to the eternal relevance of the Islamic law are not polemical is particularly shown by his focus on the social roles of the prophets and caliphs. Notwithstanding his affiliation to the Sha'afi'i school of Islamic law, he does not make a fetish of somewhat obsessive adherence to only one particular school. He nowhere insists on following his own *madhab* in contrast to the Hanafi traditions that were in vogue on the eve of his advent in Kashmir. His major concerns as a Sufi missionary are such topics of the Islamic law as are essential for guiding and controlling social life. In particular his practical concern and imaginative qualities are reflected in his repeated emphasis on the significance of the purity of faith, prayer, alms and fasting for promoting inner piety and social stability. Viewed against the background of his meaningful discussion on such acts of worship, the *Shari'ah* does not emerge in his thought as a mere formal code of rules and regulations governing the lives of Muslims but an egalitarian ideal of supreme social significance. Within this discourse the elan vital of the Islamic state is not ultimately politics or politico-religious ideology, but a supernal consciousness of competitiveness among the believers for excelling one another in righteousness.⁴⁶ Indeed, Kashmir's transition to Islam during the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries through orderly evolution can be explained in terms of peoples' response to the teachings of the Sufis and Muslim Rishis who made the *Shari'ah* intelligible to them as a socio-religious and moral force.⁴⁷

Notes and References:

1. See Ishaq Khan, *Experiencing Islam* (Sterling, New Delhi; Oxford University Press, Karachi; University Press, Dacca 1997).
2. That customary laws have always existed in Muslim societies should not delude us into believing that the *Shari'ah* has been consciously and deliberately violated out of disrespect by a great majority of Muslims in the subcontinent. See Katherine Eaving (ed.), *Shariat and Ambiguity in South Asian Islam* (Berkeley, 1988). As a matter of fact, the adherence to both the customary law and *Shari'ah* in South Asian Muslim societies points to the social nature of conversion to Islam which by no means can be described as complete in a strict religious sense. On several categories of conversion to Islam, see Ishaq Khan, *Kashmir's Transition to Islam: The Role of Muslim Rishis* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1994; 2000; the third edition forthcoming; Urdu translation recently released under the title: *Kashmir maen Isha'at-i Islam*, Gulshan Publishers, Srinagar, 2002).
3. In *mal'fuz* literature there is strong evidence to show that Sufis always emphasized the importance of the *Shari'ah* as a moral code in everyday life of the individual.
4. The Qur'anic concept of sovereignty needs to be understood in the spirituo-historical rather than politico-religious context in which sense it vests neither with the people nor with an absolute ruler. While despotism dies with wielders of power and absolute authority, the outward grandeur of great empires and kingdoms vanishes in thin air in the twinkling of an eye in the Qur'anic sense. The Qur'an is explicit on the question of principles of government. Allah is the Absolute Ruler (*Ahkam al-Hakimīn*). He grants license to rule a certain part of the globe to whom He wills. The recipients of such power are both rulers or nations and religious leaders. While in the case of the former power is a trust as well as a trial for managing the worldly affairs in accordance with the universal ethics of primordial *din*, in the latter case sovereignty symbolises the power bestowed on the chosen few from Allah's Presence (*ladunna*), and whose mission as prophets, *ulamā-i haqq* and sufis is to wage an incessant struggle for the enforcement of the moral code (*Shari'ah*) through precept and example. The Qur'anic verse, referring to the Prophet Yusuf, "Thou has given (something) of sovereignty and has taught me (something) of the

- interpretation of events" (al-Qur'an. XII: 101) needs to be understood in a deeper spirituo-historical sense.
5. Popularly known in Kashmir as Shah-i Hamadan, Mir Sayyid Ali was born in Hamadan in October, 1314. He travelled extensively to popularise the Kubraw order of the Sufis in Central Asia and Persia. He came to Kashmir in the 1380s during the reign of Sultan Qutbuddin . During his sojourn in the Valley Sayyid Ali remained the royal guest and was able to impart true knowledge of the *Shari'ah* to the Sultan. So considerable was the influence of the Sayyid on the Sultan that he conformed himself to the *Shari'ah* in personal life as far as possible. See Haidar Bakashi, *Manqabat al-jawāhir* , Research Library , Kashmir University (henceforth abbreviated as RLKU), Ms. 596, f. 75a.
 6. Several manuscripts of the letters of Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani are preserved in the RLKU , Srinagar. The manuscripts that I have consulted bear the title of *Maktūbāt* (Nos. 1979; 2490) and *Rasā'il* (Nos. 1600; 1966).
 7. *Al-Bukhāri*
 8. Its essential purpose is to guide Muslim rulers in the discharge of their duties towards their subjects in the light of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*. The essence of the Sayyid's admonitions to rulers — inadequately brought home in the modern assessment of his work — is his concern for rendering equitable justice, irrespective of religious differences. While nine chapters of the book mainly focus on religious, social and ethical issues, only one chapter is devoted to the government and its obligations towards the subjects. Two Urdu translations of *Dhakhīrat al-Mulūk* are useful. See Mohammad Riyaz, *Dhakhīrat al-Mulūk* (Indian ed., Islamic Foundation, New Delhi,); Shamsuddin Ahmad, *Dhakhīra' Sa'adāt* (Ali Mohammad and Sons, Srinagar, 1993)
 9. See Ishaq Khan, "A Study of Ritual Behaviour and its Impact on the Evolution of Kashmiri Muslim Society", *Islam and Christian -Muslim Relations*, Birmingham, vol. 5, No, I, 1994.
 10. Continuous and sustained struggle against the snares of the self or the soul and its base instincts.
 11. For a critique of religio-political ideology, see Ishaq Khan, *Experiencing Islam*.
 12. See Ishaq Khan, *Kashmir's Transition to Islam* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1994; paperback ed. 1997), p. 6

13. *Ibid.*
14. Sayyid Ali addressed himself to the task of first reforming the Sultan, rather than converting his non-Muslim subjects who were separated from a scholar like him by the barriers of language. He made Qutubuddin conscious of his obligations towards fulfilling requirements of the *Shari'ah* in his personal life. The Sultan kept two sisters as his wives. But it was on the Sayyid's advice that he divorced the eldest of his wives. Abdul Wahab, *Fathāt-i Kubrawiyya*, ff. 147b-48b; Hasan bin Ali, *Tārīkh-i Kashmir*, f. 108b; Haidar Malik Chadura, *Tārīkh-i Kashmir*, f. 110b
15. See *Dhakhīrat al -Mulūk* (Riyaz, op.cit.pp.166, 179,181-94).
16. Jafar Badakshi, *Khulāsāt al-Manāqib*, R.P.D no, f.20b
17. Aziz Ahmad, "Conversions to Islam in the Valley of Kashmir", *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1-2, 1979
18. *Kashmir's Transition to Islam*, pp.62-63
19. Aziz Ahmad . op.cit.
20. *Kashmir's Transition to Islam*, pp.62-63
21. *Ibid.*
22. Sayyid Ali, *Tārīkh-i Kashmir*, f.4; Wahab, *Fathat-iKubrawiyya*, f.115a
23. *Ibid*; Jonaraja, *Rajatarangini*, p.53
24. Jonaraja, *Rajatarangini*, p.53
25. Sayyid Ali, *Majmu -Rasāil*, f.26b See also *Risala-i'Uqbāt* (quoted in Riyaz, op.cit., p.54).
26. *Kashmir's Transition to Islam*, pp.65-69
27. See for the explanation of a subtle distinction between Islam and Islam and Islamisation, *Experiencing Islam*, pp.3; 120; also *ibid.*, Chapter VII, "Islamisation of Knowledge", pp.97-109.
28. See Ishaq Khan, "A Study of Muslim Ritual and the Evolution of Kashmiri Muslim Society', op.cit
29. The Ahl-i Hadith and Jam'at-i Islami do not dispute the Tawhidic spirit underlying *Aurād-i Fathiyyah*; but what is objectionable to them is its loud recitation in chorus in what they call the manner of Hindus.
30. See for details, Ishaq Khan, "A Study of Muslim Ritual...", op.cit
31. Sayyid Ali, *Majmu Rasāil*, MS.no 1966, ff. 26ab
32. *Ibid.*

33. For more discussion on this point, see *Experiencing Islam*, pp.3; 120-21
34. Sayyid Ali to Tughan Shah, *Majmu Rasā'il*.
35. See for a detailed discussion on this point, *Dhakhīrat al-Mulūk*, chapter Vi; also *ibid* (Riyaz, *op.cit*, p.179)
36. *Ibid* (Riyaz, *op.cit.*, pp.167-68)
37. *Ibid.*,p.168
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*,pp.231-32
40. He calls them the enemies of God and the Messenger and successors of the devil (*nāib dajjāl*). See *Ibid.*,p.179
41. *Ibid.*
42. See *Ibid.*,chapter v. True, at the end of the chapter Sayyid Ali quotes the Covenant of the caliph 'Umar to make a clear distinction between the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims in the Islamic state. But in his letter to Sultan Qutubuddin , written from Pakhli on the eve of his departure , Sayyid Ali urges Qutubuddin to render justice to his subjects without any discrimination. Significantly, in the same letter the Sayyid describes the Brahman form of worship in respectful terms.
43. *Dhakhīrat al-Mulūk* (Riyaz, *op. cit.*, pp.178-79)
44. *Ibid.*
45. Sayyid Ali to Sultan Alauddin of Pakhli, *Maktūbāt*, ff. Also *Dhakhirat al-Muluk*, chapter iv
46. On this point, See *Experiencing Islam*
47. See for greater details, *Kashmir's Transition to Islam*.